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ABSTRACT 
Using both quantitative data from national surveys and qualitative data from our recent field 
research, this paper provides evidence on the recent transformation of Japan's celebrated practice 
of "lifetime employment" (or implicit long-term employment contract for the regular workforce). 
Overall, contrary to the popular rhetoric of "the end of lifetime employment," evidence points to 
the enduring nature of such practice in Japan. Specifically, we find little evidence for any major 
decline in the job retention rates of Japanese employees from the period prior to the burst of the 
bubble economy in late 1980s to the post-bubble period. In general, our field research 
corroborates the main finding from the job retention rates by describing vividly that large firms 
in Japan have been doing everything they can to avoid laying off their workers. However, the 
field research also points to a potentially important measurement issue with the job retention 
rates which may cause the job retention rates to overstate the importance of long-term 
employment in recent years. Lastly, the burden of downsizing appears to fall disproportionately 
on young workers and middle-age workers with shorter tenure. 
JEL: J63, J64, O53 
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THE END OF LIFETIME EMPLOYMENT IN JAPAN? 
EVIDENCE FROM NATIONAL SURVEYS AND FIELD RESEARCH 
I. Introduction 
Using both quantitative data from national surveys and qualitative data from our recent field 
research, this paper provides evidence on the recent transformation of Japan's celebrated practice 
of "lifetime employment" (or implicit long-term employment contract for the regular workforce). 
Though traditional Japanese employment practices, such as lifetime employment, are not 
universal phenomena among Japanese firms, they apply to the core of the Japanese tabor force, 
or blue-collar male employees in large firms and white-collar male workers (see, for instance, 
Koike, 1991). Furthermore, the employment relationship in Japan is found to be considerably 
more of long-term nature than in the United States (See, for instance, Hashimoto and Raisian, 
1985).' 
Japanese employers always felt a need to introduce flexibility to their employment 
practices and began their attempts to weaken these traditional employment practices as early as 
late 1960s. Until recently, however, employers* attempts to weaken these traditional 
employment practices appear to have not produced any major changes.2 Therefore, it is of great 
topical interest to find out whether Japan's economic slowdown in the 1990s following the burst 
of the bubble economy in late 1980s is finally ending these traditional employment practices. 
While the rhetoric of "the end of lifetime employment" is presently rampant, concrete data on 
changes in traditional employment practices are relatively scarce (Dore, 1996). We have been 
collecting and analyzing such data (including both quantitative data from national surveys and 
According to Higuchi (1997), however, the difference in the importance of long-term employment 
between Japan and Western European nations appears to be much smaller than between Japan and the U.S. 
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qualitative data from our own field research), and this paper presents the first main findings from 
our analysis of the data. 
A closer look at the recent transformation of Japan's lifetime employment system is of 
particular public policy interest. For instance, the practice of lifetime employment points to an 
industrial relations system favorable to successful employee participation which has contributed 
to the postwar success of Japanese firms, in particular in manufacturing.3 Probably as a result of 
these favorable environments in the postwar Japanese economy, in particular in manufacturing, 
participatory employment practices spread widely and were established firmly.4 Indeed these 
practices became the hallmark of "Japanese management," which has been inspiring (or 
necessitating in some instances) many corporations in the world to experiment with employee 
involvement and labor-management cooperation in recent years (see, for instance, Levine, 1995: 
5). In short, the practice of lifetime employment can be considered an indispensable ingredient of 
successful "Japanese management." 
The economic slowdown in the 1990s (in particular the recent banking crisis)5 has 
allegedly been eroding the environments favorable to the practice of lifetime employment. Has 
the practice of lifetime employment been surviving in Japan in the 1990s? If so, how has it been 
evolving to cope with the new environment in the 1990s? Are there any differences between 
different sectors of the economy in the survival of lifetime employment? To address these 
questions, we have been gathering and analyzing both quantitative data from national surveys and 
qualitative data from our own field research on evolving employment practices in the 1990s. This 
2
 See, for instance, Morishima (1992) 
3
 For participatory employment practices in Japan, see Jones and Kato (1995), Kato and Morishima (1995), 
and Kato (2000) for example. 
4
 See, for instance, Kato and Morishima (1999). 
5
 For recent studies on the economic slowdown in the 1990s and the banking crisis in Japan, see for 
example Hoshi and Kashyap (1999). 
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paper reports the first findings from our analysis of these data on the possible transformation of 
lifetime employment during Japan's economic slowdown in the 1990s. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present quantitative evidence 
on changes in the prevalence of lifetime employment from the 1980s to the 1990s, using the most 
recent Employment Status Survey (1997) along with the Survey in the previous years. In 
Section III, we try to corroborate the quantitative evidence with our field visits which provide 
detailed and vivid information on the extensive use of reduced hiring and transfers of employees 
to related firms as alternatives to layoffs. A concluding section then follows. 
II. Changes in the Job Retention Rates of Japanese Employees 
Following the procedures developed by Hall (1982) and later applied to the Japanese data 
by Hashimoto and Raisian (1985), we use the Employment Status Survey and estimate the job 
retention rates of Japanese employees. To the best of our knowledge, the Employment Status 
Survey is the only nationally representative survey of Japanese workers which provides 
information on job tenure and is comparable to CPS tenure supplements of the U.S.6 The Survey 
has been conducted by the Statistics Bureau, Management and Coordination Agency every five 
years, and various cross tabulations from the most recent Survey (1997) were published lately. 
We recently obtained unpublished tables from the 1997 Survey as well as the 1987 Survey and 
the 1977 Survey which contain sufficient information for calculating the ten-year job retention 
rates of Japanese employees for the ten-year period prior to the burst of the bubble economy 
6
 Hashimoto and Rasian (1985) used earlier years of the same survey for Japan and CPS tenure 
supplements for the U.S., and compared the importance of long-term employment between the two nations in the 
1960s and the 1970s. Interest in studies of the importance of long-term employment in the U.S. has been rekindled 
recently in light of the rising popular perception of disappearing long-term jobs in the U.S. In response, a number 
of researchers in the U.S. have been using CPS tenure supplements to address this popular perception {see, for 
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(1977-87) and the post-bubble period (1987-97).7 
As shown in Table 1, in 1977, 18.55 percent of the civilian noninstitutional population 
ages 15-19 were employees (as opposed to self-employed and not in the labor force) and had 
been with the same employer tor 4 years or less (or in the 0-4-year tenure category). Ten years 
later in 1987, 6.1 percent of the civilian noninstitutional population ages 25-29 were employees 
in the 10-14-year tenure category. According to Hall (1982) and Hashimoto and Raisian (1985), 
the ten-year job retention rate of all employees ages 15-19 with 0-4 years of tenure in 1977 was 
6.1/18.55=32.89 percent.8 In other words, in 1977 the average employee ages 15-19 with 0-4 
years of tenure in Japan had a 32.89 percent chance of being with the same employer ten years 
later.9 The table also shows the ten-year job retention rates of employees in various age-tenure 
example, Neumark and Polsky, 1998 and Farber, 1998). 
7
 We focus on the ten-year job retention rates rather than the fifteen-year job retention rates that Hashimotc 
and Raisian (1985) calculated since we are interested in the impact of the significant economic slowdown in the 
1990s, following the burst of the bubble economy. Our comparison of the ten-year job retention rates between the 
ten-year period followed by the burst of the bubble economy and the ten-year period immediately following the 
burst will allow us to detect appropriately any erosion of lifetime employment in the significant economic 
slowdown following the burst of the bubble economy in Japan. On the other hand, unfortunately, given the Survey 
prior to 1977 was conducted every three years instead of every five years, it is impossible to calculate the fifteen-
year job retention rates consecutively from the period prior to the burst of the bubble economy to the post-bubble 
period. It is, however, possible to calculate the fifteen-year job retention rates for 1982-1997 and compare them to 
the fifteen-year job retention rates for 1962-1977 that Hashimoto and Raisian (1985) calculated. As shown later, 
reassuringly this comparison confirms our key findings from comparing the ten-year job retention rates between 
1977-87 and 1987-97. 
8
 We assume (so did prior studies) that no employee separates from his/her firm, works for other firms for a 
few years, and returns to the initial firm. To the extent to which some employees follow this pattern, the calculated 
job retention rates overstate the importance of long-term employment. Unfortunately, we have no systematic data to 
account for this possible bias. However, in the Japanese labor market, we speculate very few employees follow this 
pattern. Note that some employees on fixed-term transfer (shukko) to subsiduaries and related firms, as we discuss 
in the next section, will return to the original firm. However, since those on fixed-term transfer keep their 
employment relationship with the initial firm while on transfer, it appears to be appropriate to count their time on 
fixed term transfer in their tenure with the original firm. A potentially more important measurement issue with the 
job retention rates arises from the fact that many of those on fixed transfer are indeed permanently transferred and 
separate from the original firm eventually. We will discuss this measurement issue in the next section more fully. 
9
 Hall (1982) and Hashimoto and Raisian (1985) divide the number of employees in each age-tenure 
category by the civilian noninstitutional population in the corresponding age category. We follow the same 
procedure in the paper. However, using the number of employees in each age-tenure category itself instead will 
change the ten-year job retention rates very little. 
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categories in 1977.10 We repeated the same calculations for the most recent ten-year period of 
1987-97. The results are also shown in Table 1. Figure 1 depicts the ten-year job retention rates 
of all employees in each tenure-age category for 1977-87 and 1987-97. 
Overall, we find little evidence for serious erosion of the practice of "lifetime 
employment." Specifically, among core employees of Japanese firms (or those who are 30-34, 
35-39, and 40-44 years old with 5+ years of tenure), the ten-year job retention rates were around 
80 percent for the bubble period of 1977-87. In other words, four in five core employees of 
Japanese firms in 1977 retained the same job ten years later. The situation changed little for the 
post-bubble period of 1987-97. Approximately four in five core employees of Japanese firms in 
1987 survived the turbulent years of the Japanese economy and retained the same job ten years 
later. 
On the other hand, among younger employees (ages 20-24, and 25-29) and middle age 
employees with short tenure (ages 30-34, 35-39, and 40-44 with 0-4 years of tenure), the job 
retention rates fell noticeably from the bubble period to the post-bubble period. For example, 58 
percent of employees ages 35-39 with 0-4 years of tenure in 1977 retained the same job ten years 
later whereas only 46 percent did in 1987. 
The practice of lifetime employment is often said to apply only to male employees where 
female employees serve as a shock absorber in Japan." Tables 2 and 3 and Figures 2 and 3 show 
the ten-year job retention rates of male and female employees for 1977-87 and 1987-97. 
10
 We eliminated the category of ages 15-19 and tenure 5+ as Hashimoto and Raisian (1985) did since there 
were very few people in this category. For 1977, the number of employees with less than one year of tenure was 
available only for the age category 40-54 and was not available for 40-44, 45-49 and 50-54 separately. We used the 
number of employees with one year of tenure for each of these three age categories in 1977 to estimate the number 
of employees with less than one year of tenure for each of these three age categories. Since there were relatively 
few people in those three age-tenure categories, we are confident that using these estimates rather than the actual 
numbers will have little impact on the ten-year job retention rates of employees ages 40-44, ages 45-49, and ages 
50-54 in 1977. 
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As expected, the ten-year job retention rates were considerably lower for female 
employees than for male employees for all age-tenure categories and for both bubble and post-
bubble periods. The difference was particularly large for young employees ages 15-19, 20-24 
and 25-29. For instance, the probability for a male employee age 20-24 to be with the same 
employer ten years later was three times higher than the one for the female counterpart. 
Interestingly, among middle age female employees with 5+ year of tenure, the ten-year job 
retention rates were around 70 percent, and the gender difference was not as pronounced as 
among younger employees and middle age employees with short tenure. 
Regarding changes in the ten-year job retention rates over time, we find more discernible 
declines in the retention rates among female employees than among male employees. In 
particular, among female employees ages 30-34, 35-39, and 40-44 with short tenure (0-4 years), 
the ten-year job retention rates fell substantially from the bubble period to the post-bubble 
period. For example, female employees ages 35-39 with 0-4 years of tenure enjoyed an almost 
60 percent chance of ten-year job retention for 1977-87 whereas they enjoyed only 40 percent of 
ten-year job retention for 1987-97. 
In sum, overall, evidence points to the enduring nature of the practice of lifetime 
employment. The burden of downsizing during the economic slowdown in the 1990s appears to 
have fallen disproportionately on young employees and middle age employees with short tenure, 
in particular middle age female employees with short tenure. 
Finally, using the 1982 and 1997 Employment Status Survey, we calculated the fifteen-
year job retention rates of male employees and compared them to the fifteen-year job retention 
rates of male employees for 1962-1977 that Hashimoto and Raisian (1985) calculated. As shown 
11
 See, for instance, Abraham and Houseman (1989). 
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in Table 4, lifetime employment is still alive and well for core employees ages 25-39 with 5 
years of tenure who continue to enjoy over 70 percent chances of being with the same employer 
fifteen years later. Furthermore, comparing the fifteen-year job retention rates of male 
employees for 1982-97 to the ones for 1962-77 that Hashimoto and Raisian (1985) calculated 
points to the enduring nature of the practice of lifetime employment. The only age-tenure group 
who experienced a noticeable fall in the fifteen-year job retention rate is young employees ages 
20-24 with 5+ years of tenure who counted only 12.2 percent of the population in 1982.12 
III. Evidence from field research 
In summer of 1999, we conducted field research at a number of Japanese firms. In winter of 
1999, we had written both management and union, asking to locate and assemble some specific 
data on their employment practices detailing what kind of questions we intend to ask when we 
visit them in summer of 1999. They did take our request very seriously and spent a lot of time 
and effort to prepare often confidential data for us.13 
In addition to an obvious advantage of field research that more detailed and richer 
analysis is possible, there is an added advantage. The above analysis of the Employment Status 
Survey does not tell us anything about changes in the practice of lifetime employment after 1997. 
It is conceivable that the impact of the economic slowdown may be appearing at last only after 
12
 Another key finding of Hashimoto and Rasian (1985) is that the importance of tenure in earnings profiles 
of male employees is much greater in Japan than in the U.S. There has been a controversy over this finding. Clark 
and Ogawa (1992) re-estimated earnings equations of Hashimoto and Rasian (1985) using more recent data and 
suggested a significant change in the Japanese labor market in the 1980s, specifically a substantially diminished role 
of tenure in earnings profiles of Japanese male employees in the 1980s. In response, Hashimoto and Rasian (1992) 
discounted their conclusion by providing additional evidence which is more mixed than the one provided by Clark 
and Ogawa (1992). Our finding of stable job retention rates over time appears to be more consistent with the 
cautionary view of Hashimoto and Rasian (1992) on changes in the Japanese labor market. 
13
 We interviewed both management and union to maximize the accuracy of the information. Kato (2000) 
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1997. Our field research from summer of 1999 provides the most recent picture of employment 
practices. 
We introduce three cases here which demonstrate the scope and nature of Japanese-style 
downsizing most vividly. All three cases are large manufacturing firms in three representative 
industries in Japan who have downsized its labor force considerably in the 1990s. Each firm is a 
leading firm in its industry and is a familiar name not only domestically but also globally. 
a. Firm A 
Firm A is a large manufacturing firm with sales of over 3 trillion yen (nearly half of which is 
export sales) and employment of close to 40,000 workers in 1998. It is publicly traded in the first 
section of Tokyo Stock Exchange. The corporation has eleven establishments in addition to its 
corporate headquarters. 
Figures 4 and 5 summarize changes in key characteristics of Firm A for the last two 
decades. Figure 4 shows sales in 1982 yen, labor (the total number of employees) and share 
price (the annual average price of stock). All variables in Figure 4 are relative to their 1982 
levels. Note that those on fixed-term transfer to other firms (shukko) are included in labor. We 
also calculated standard accounting firm performance measures such as ROA and ROE as well as 
shareholder returns (a standard economic firm performance measure or rate of change in share 
price plus dividend rate). It is obvious from the tables that in the 1990s the firm's performance 
worsened and became more volatile. It cut 30 percent of its labor force throughout the 1990s 
from about 57,000 to about 40,000. This downsizing was accomplished mostly by a 
combination of limited hiring and transfers of workers to related firms without laying off 
describes this field research in more detail. 
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workers. 
The firm hired over 3,000 college and high school graduates right after their graduation in 
1990. In the next three years, the firm continued to reduce this new graduate hiring, and hired 
about 2,000 in 1993. New graduate hiring was extremely restrained in the next four years 
ranging from 482 to 62. The new graduate hiring level did bounce back somewhat in 1998 and 
1999, reaching the 1,000 level. 
As shown in Table 5, about 2,000 employees were transferred to its sales firms, other 
related firms, and other unrelated firms each year on a fixed-year term (typically two-year term) 
for 1995 and 1996.14 Those on fixed term transfer continue to be employees of Firm A and thus 
there is no break in their tenure with Firm A. They continue to be on Firm A's payroll. The 
number of fixed term transfers has declined to a little over 1,000 recently. The status of some of 
those on fixed term transfer were changed to permanently transferred (tenseki), and they were no 
longer employees of Firm A. Six hundreds to seven hundreds workers were permanently 
transferred each year for the last four years except for the most recent year when the firm 
experienced a substantial reduction in the number of permanent transfers. Since most of those 
permanently transferred were on fixed term transfer initially, these numbers suggest that roughly 
30 percent of those on fixed term transfer never returned to the firm and became permanently 
transferred. Almost all employees on fixed term transfer were over 50 years old and white-collar 
workers. The majority of fixed term transfers are to its sales firms whereas permanent transfers 
were more evenly distributed between sales firms and other related firms. Note that non-
negligible number of employees has been transferred to non-related firms. When a worker is 
permanently transferred, the firm pays him/her a severance pay of up to five years of his/her 
10 
annual base wage. 
Permanent transfers do present some shopfloor morale problem. Some employees 
complain: "I wished I could have remain in Firm A and have attended my daughter's wedding as 
a proud employee of Firm A." Being an employee of a famous and prestigious company like 
Firm A means a status quo. Though making sense financially to be transferred permanently, 
many employees accept permanent transfer with some mixed feelings. 
In addition, the firm used a special early retirement incentive pay during 1995 and 
induced over 4,000 early retirements (retirements before the firm's mandatory retirement age of 
60) during the year. At age 30, an early retiree was offered 12 months of monthly pay in 
addition to his/her standard pension; at age 40, 18 months; at age 50, 48 months; at age 58, 3 
months. The firm was again using a similar early retirement incentive pay at the time of our field 
visit. 
In general Firm A's use of part-time employees has been quite modest. In the process of 
this downsizing, the amount of work has not been declining as fast as the number of employees. 
To cope with this overloading of existing full-time regular employees, the firm has increased the 
number of part-time employees. In January of 1994, the firm had 64 part-time employees. In 
January of 1999, the firm had 123 part-time employees. 82 of them (67 were female) were 
engaged in clerical and other white-collar work whereas 36 of them (33 were female) were 
engaged in simple manual task to assist regular production workers (such as moving materials); 
and 5 actually worked as production workers. 
14
 For an earlier study of fixed-term transfers, sec Brunello (1988) 
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b. Firm B 
Firm B is a large manufacturer with sales of a few trillions of yen (about one quarter of which is 
export sales) and employment of close to 20,000 workers in 1998. It is also listed in the first 
section of Tokyo Stock Exchange. The firm has over ten establishments. 
Figures 6 and 7 summarize changes in key characteristics of Firm B for the last two 
decades. Firm performance continued to worsen in the 1990s. It cut almost 50 percent of its 
labor force throughout the 1990s. This downsizing was accomplished mostly by a combination 
of limited hiring and transfers of workers to related firms without laying off workers (The firm 
has maintained no layoff policy). 
Firm B hires college and high school graduates right after their graduation as regular 
employees and rarely likes those with full-time work experience. The only recent exception was 
that during 1990 and 1991, over 100 experienced workers were brought in from other industries. 
In 1990 and 1991, the firm was starting a new business and needed a large number of 
experienced workers quickly. The firm did not engage in any active raiding of these employees 
from other firms yet did use a headhunting firm to identify a few key employees and sought them 
after aggressively. 
The hiring of new college and high school graduates upon graduation was around 1,000 
per year till early 1990s. Since 1995, however, the firm has cut its hiring by nearly two thirds. 
The firm's recent reductions in hiring were more acute for white-collar occupations than for blue-
collar occupations. For example, in 1991, the firm hired 800 into white-collar occupations (most 
of them are college graduates) while it hired only 150 in 1999. 
In parallel to hiring cut, like Firm A, Firm B has been using transfers of employees as a 
main device of downsizing. Most important is fixed term and permanent transfers to other firms. 
12 
During 1991-93, the firm transferred on average over 1,000 employees (about two thirds of them 
are white-collar) a year to various firms on a three-year term. The number of fixed term transfers 
rose dramatically for the following three years, amounting to on average 3,000 employees (a half 
of them are white-collar) dispatched to other firms every year. The level of transfer activity has 
returned to the 1991-93 level, i.e., about 1,000 employees (the majority of them are white-collar) 
have been transferred to other firms on a three-year term every year for the last two years (1997 
and 1998). 
The firm seeks possible fixed term transfer outlets among its related firms first. 
However, given its magnitude, it has been impossible to find all necessary transfer outlets among 
those related firms, and therefore the firm has been working hard to cultivate alternative transfer 
outlets, including non-manufacturing firms, such as sales person for wireless phones, and public 
sector such as schools. Normally, those who are considered for transfer will be consulted by the 
immediate supervisor in advance. The extent to which this consultation takes place depends on 
how familiar transfer outlets are to these transfer-bound employees. Some outlets are familiar 
places for its employees in which many of their former colleagues are working as a result of 
transfers in the past. Transfers to such familiar places do not require careful consultation. On the 
other hand, transfers to some unfamiliar firms require thorough consultation. As mentioned, 
typically the term of transfer is three years. However, in reality, many of those on fixed term 
transfer became permanently transferred and never returned to the firm. Normally, only those 
who were transferred on a fixed term to help its subsidiaries and related firms as technical 
advisor return to the parent firm after the term is over. As such, fixed term transfers? are viewed 
as a first step for eventual permanent transfers by many employees. Typically, near-retirement 
employees are approached for possible transfers. Only employees over age 55 are subject to 
13 
permanent transfers. Doth union and management argue that those who are 55 or older and 
already on fixed term transfer often prefer to be permanently transferred and continue to work 
there till his mandatory retirement age of 60 rather than returning to the firm and spend several 
years at the original firm before his retirement. 
Over 1,000 employees were permanently transferred on average every year during 1991-
93. About 70 percent of them were white-collar employees. The number of permanent transfers 
increased to nearly 4,000 (about a half of them are white-collar) a year on average during the 
next three years. Permanent transfers have leveled off somewhat recently, and about 2,500 
employees have been permanently transferred every year on average during the last two years. 
When an employee is permanently transferred, Firm B pays him/her a severance pay which 
compensates for any loss in his/her income as a result of leaving Firm B prior to his/her 
mandatory retirement age of 60. 
Firm B used to use transfers of production workers to other plants within the firm (haiten) 
more heavily in comparison to transfers of such workers to other firms.15 However, in the 1990s, 
transfers to other plants within the firm became an insignificant practice, i.e., only 200 
employees were transferred to other plants within the firm throughout the 1990s. This reflects 
the comprehensive nature of Japan's economic slowdown in the 1990s, in particular for Firm B in 
which nearly all of their product lines experienced sharp declines in their demand. In addition, 
transfers to other plants within the firm often involves relocation of employees on transfer and 
their families, and more and more employees prefer transfers to other firms in the same vicinity 
(thus not requiring relocation) to transfers to other plants within the firm necessitating relocation. 
For production workers, the firm has successfully induced early retirements in the 1990s. 
15
 For an earlier study of transfers of workers to other establishments within the firm, see Kato (1991). 
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On average approximately 500 production workers Hearing their retirement age of 60 has taken 
an early retirement option every year since 1991. The firm has been offering a significant 
financial incentive for early retirements. For example, if one takes an early retirement option at 
age 50, he/she will receive over 150,000 dollars which amounts to roughly two years of earnings 
(base wage plus bonus) in addition to his/her normal pension. The amount of an incentive pay 
for early retirement decreases as one decides to retire closer to his/her mandatory retirement age 
of 60. For example, if one retires one year prior to the mandatory retirement age, he/she will get 
only about 30,000 dollars in addition to his/her normal pension. 
c. Firm C 
Firm C is a large manufacturer with sales of four trillions of yen (about one fifth of which is 
export sales) and employment of over 65,000 workers in 1998. It is also listed in the first section 
of Tokyo Stock Exchange. 
Figures 8 and 9 summarize changes in key characteristics of Firm C for the last two 
decades. As shown in Figure 9, firm performance continued to worsen in the 1990s, and the 
firm's after-tax profit became negative in 1998 for the first time. It slashed almost 25 percent of 
its labor force throughout the 1990s.16 Like the above cases, this downsizing was accomplished 
mostly by a combination of limited hiring and transfers of workers to related firms without 
laying off workers. 
As shown in Table 6, till early 1990s, every year Firm C had hired around 4,000 college 
and high school graduates as regular employees right after their graduation. The firm reduced its 
16 As shown in Figure 8, unlike Firms A and B, Firm C has not experienced a serious decline in sales. Yet 
the firm has been downsizing its labor force in response to worsening profitability, measured by ROA, ROE and 
Shareholder Returns. What has been causing Japanese firms to downsize their labor force is an important and 
15 
hiring drastically (by three fourths) in the latter half of the 1990s, hiring only 800 to 1,100 a year. 
The hiring cut has been more acute for high school graduates than for college graduates. As 
such, the proportion of college graduates has doubled from about 35 percent in early 1990s to 70 
percent or higher in the second half of the 1990s. In addition to hiring of new graduates, the firm 
has been engaged in a small number of mid-career hires. Only till recently such hires were quite 
rare, constituting less than 3 percent of the total hires. However, the firm has increased mid-
career hires lately and now such hires constitute 8-10 percent of the total hires. Those mid-career 
hires were mostly young professionals, such as system engineers and financial analysts, in their 
30s. The firm does not engage in any active raiding of employees from other firms yet does use 
a headhunting firm. 
In addition to hiring outs, like the above two cases, Firm C's primary mechanism of 
downsizing is transfers of its employees. Unlike Firm B, however, Firm C still uses transfers of 
employees to other establishments within the firm. Specifically, in 1991 through 1993, 290 
production workers were permanently transferred from home appliance division to industrial 
appliance division. Both divisions require similar skill yet work in the industrial appliance 
division tends to be more physically demanding. Since both divisions are in the same vicinity, 
these permanent transfers did not require any relocation of these employees. In 1992 to 1993, 
190 white-collar employees (mostly engineers) were permanently transferred to sales department 
of the firm. Engineers who were designing various appliances ended up doing sales. This 
represents a substantial change in the nature of work and relocation. In 1993 to 1995, 750 
employees including both blue-collar and white-collar were permanently transferred from home 
appliance division to other divisions within the same vicinity. In 1994 to 1996, 210 employees 
interesting question. However, it is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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(both blue-collar and white-collar) were transferred permanently from home appliance division to 
IT division in the same city. Most recently, in 1998-99, 800 white-collar employees in a variety 
of functional departments (such as research and development, accounting, HR, sales and 
marketing) in various divisions were permanently transferred to their counterparts in IT division. 
All employees received 20 days of training on IT. 
Like Firms A and B, Firm C in its effort to downsize avoids layoffs by using extensively 
fixed term and permanent transfers to other firms. As shown in Table 6, during 1989-98, Firm C 
had on average about 8,500 employees on fixed-term transfer each year. The number rose over 
the period and remained at the 10,000 level in late 1990s. In other words, over 10 percent of 
Firm C's total labor force was on fixed-term transfer each year. Nearly 90 percent of those on 
fixed-term transfer were at Firm C's subsidiaries and other related firms, The rest of them are at 
a variety of places such as government agencies. The term of transfer is normally one to three 
years. Those on transfer for the purpose of helping subsidiaries and other related firms as 
advisors will normally return to Firm C after their terms. However, in the 1990s, more and more 
employees were transferred to subsidiaries and other related firms as a result of business 
restructuring and downsizing of Firm C (for example, transferring a business segment of Firm C 
to subsidiaries). Those employees tend to have their contracts of transfer extended and in the end 
be permanently transferred. Normally the official switch of their employment from Firm C to 
their respective firms takes place when they reach ages 50-55. Firm C's mandatory retirement 
age is 60, and many recent permanent transfers can be viewed as a sort of early retirements with 
post-retirement jobs arranged by the firm. 
As shown in Table 6, on average, each year about 1,400 employees were permanently 
transferred during 1989-98, and the figure was rising over the period, surpassing the 2000 level 
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in 1998. Nearly all of those permanent transfers were to subsidiaries and related firms. About 
half of those permanent transfers were switches from fixed-term transfers to permanent transfers. 
Since the average number of employees on fixed-term transfer during 1989-98 was 8,500, each 
year 8 percent of those on fixed-term transfer were switched to permanently transferred. 
There is no formal mechanism of prior consultation with those considered for fixed-term 
transfers. On the other hand, for permanent transfers, there is an agreement between labor union 
and management which requires management to consult with those considered for such transfers. 
However, it has been often the case that permanent transfers are necessitated by transferring a 
certain business segment to a related firm. In such a case, there is really no place to go back 
within Firm C even if one prefers to return to Firm C. Employees often find themselves 
impossible to return to Firm C even if they wish to do so. 
Sometimes wages of permanently transferred employees go down at their new firms. 
Firm C will pay those employees a lump-sum severance pay to make up for the decline in their 
pay. As a result of recent surges in transfers, more and more new graduates at their interviews 
with Firm C tend to ask if the firm has any future plans to spinning off some of their business 
segments. However, Firm C's HR managers feel that recent increases in permanent transfers 
have not had any significant adverse effects on employee morale. 
In 1996, Firm C introduced an early retirement option combined with a paid leave of 
absence. The policy allows each employee over 45 taking an early retirement option to take a 
paid leave of absence up to one year prior to hislher retirement. During this preparation period, 
each employee prepares for his/her post-retirement life while paid a base wage fully. During the 
first year of the policy, 302 employees (120 of them were supervisors) took the early retirement 
option with a paid leave of absence. The number fell to 78 (12 supervisors) in 1997 but rose 
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back to 237 (68 supervisors) in 1998. 64 percent of early retirees were 55-59 ages, 27 percent 
50-45; and 9 percent 45-49. There were a variety of things those early retirees end up doing. 
Some went to English schools during their paid leave of absence and became English teachers. 
Some prepared for the licensing exam for radiological technologists. Many went back to their 
hometowns and became farmers. Some also started their own businesses such as car dealership 
in their hometowns. 
d. concluding remarks from field research 
1. No layoff: In spite of the sizable downsizing of the labor force that each firm carried out 
in the 1990s (ranging from 25 to 50 percent), no firm resorted to layoffs. They have 
honored "no layoff pledge." 
2, Extensive use of transfers to subsidiaries and related firms: Instead of laying off 
employees, each firm transferred a significant number of their senior employees to its 
subsidiaries and related firms first on a fixed-term basis. A large proportion of those on 
fixed-term transfer are eventually transferred permanently. These permanent transfers 
occur only for those in their 50s, in particular over 55. They can be viewed as early 
retirements with guaranteed jobs mostly at subsidiaries and related firms. Put differently 
large firms in Japan have been downsizing its labor force by expanding the definition of 
the firm to include the firm's subsidiaries and related firms. Lifetime employment with 
the firm now often means lifetime employment with the firm, and its subsidiaries and 
related firms. 
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3. Drastic hiring cut; Each firm reduced its hiring of new graduates drastically.17 This has 
two important consequences. First, it is creating a serious youth unemployment problem. 
For example, unemployment rate in Japan has risen most rapidly for those ages 15-24 in 
the 1990s.'8 Second, the firm's labor force is aging rapidly, weakening the dynamism of 
the organization. 
4. The job retention rates calculated in the previous section may need to be interpreted with 
caution. Specifically, our field research shows that firms have been carrying out their 
downsizing by relying heavily on the extensive use of fixed term transfers of employees 
to their subsidiaries and related firms. In addition, as shown by our field research, many 
of those on fixed term transfer never return to their original firms and are permanently 
transferred. One may argue that the length of time each employee spends while on fixed 
term transfer prior to becoming permanently transferred should not be considered part of 
his/her tenure with the original firm since both the firm and the employee understand that 
his/her employment with the firm ends de facto when he/she is transferred on a fixed-
term basis. In other words, his/her eventual tenure with the original firm may be 
overstated in the Employment Status Survey. This argument is entirely plausible yet the 
magnitude of this bias may not be large enough to overturn our key findings from the job 
retention rates since typically the term of such transfers is one to three years. 
Unfortunately, we have no systematic evidence to gauge precisely the magnitude of this 
bias. 
17
 A similar use of hiring cut as an important device of downsizing in the spinning industry was 
documented in Higuchi (1997). 
18
 See, for instance, Genda (2000) 
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IV. Conclusions 
In this paper we have shown that contrary to the popular rhetoric of "the end of lifetime 
employment," evidence points to the enduring nature of such practice in Japan. Specifically, we 
have found little evidence for any major decline in the job retention rates of Japanese employees 
from the period prior to the burst of the bubble economy in late 1980s to the post-bubble period. 
Generally, our field research has corroborated the main finding from the job retention rates by 
depicting vividly how hard large firms in Japan have been trying to avoid laying off their 
workers while carrying out considerable downsizing. However, the field research has also 
pointed to a potentially important measurement issue with the job retention rates which may 
cause the job retention rates to overstate the importance of long-term employment in recent 
years. Lastly, we have found some evidence that the burden of downsizing appears to fall 
disproportionately on young workers and middle-age workers with shorter tenure. These are still 
preliminary observations. Clearly more work is necessary to make more definitive answers to 
these important questions. In particular, a closer look at outlets of transfers (or subsidiaries, 
related firms and other firms to which employees have been transferred) is needed. 
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